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PICHIRILO v. GUZMAN: RIGHTS OF A LONGSHOREMAN 
FOR UNSEAWORTHINESS IN A DEMISE CHARTER 
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, sitting in admiralty, vacated a decision of the District Court of 
Puerto Rico imposing liability upon a shipowner for injuries incurred by a 
longshoreman, resulting from the alleged unseaworthiness of the ship on 
which he was working at the time of the injury. The case, Ruiz Pichirilo v. 
M aysonet Guzman, l involved a demise charter2 under which the demisee, 
who was also the libellant's employer, had maintained complete control of 
the ship for some five years prior to the accident.s The ship, the M/V Carib, 
was being unloaded at San Juan, Puerto Rico, when the injury occurred. A 
shackle supporting a boom of the ship broke, causing the boom to fall on 
the libellant, who was working on deck at the time. The evidence showed 
that the shackle had been recently bought. 
The libel was brought in rem4 against the Carib and in personam against 
the shipowner5 for unseaworthiness arising ostensibly from the defective con-
dition of the shackle. The District Court found the vessel to be unseaworthy 
as alleged and imposed liability on the ship and the vessel owner, Pichirilo.6 
On appeal, the Circuit Court, in an opinion by Judge Aldrich, vacated the 
judgment below and remanded with orders to dismiss, holding that the libel 
in personam was barred because the unseaworthy condition obtained after 
1. 290 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 82 Sup. Ct. 176 (1961) 
(No. 358). 
2. In a demise charter, as distinguished from a time or voyage charter, command, 
possession, and navigation of the vessel are vested solely in the demisee. This arrange-
ment is analogous to a lease of real property wherein the exclusive right to possession 
is in the lessee, the lessor retaining only a reversion. It has been stated: 
The test is one of "control"; if the owner retains control over the vessel, merely 
carrying the goods furnished or designated by the charter, the charter is not 
a demise; if the control of the vessel itself is surrendered to the charterer, so 
that the master is his man and the ship's people are his people, then we have 
to do with a demise. 
GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 4-21 (1957). 
3. The District Court had ruled that no demise existed, but the Circuit Court, 
considering that ruling clearly erroneous, held that a demise was established by the 
evidence. Pichirilo v. Guzman, supra note 1, at 813. That a demise charter did exist 
is assumed herein; however, on appeal, the issue of the propriety of the Circuit Court's 
ruling will be before the Supreme Court. 
4. The maritime in rem proceeding is unique in that it is literally a suit "against 
the ship," the vessel itself being considered a distinct party defendant. Furthermore, 
an action in rem will lie only when the subject of the claim is a maritime lien, such 
as an action for seaman's wages or an action based on the unseaworthiness of a ship. 
See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949); GILMORE 
AND BLACK, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 9-1 to 9-4. 
5. Libellant Guzman, who had received a compensation allowance from the State 
Insurance Fund pursuant to the Puerto Rico Workmen's Compensation Act, 11 
L.P.R.A. ch. 1 (1935), was thereby precluded from bringing any action against his 
employer, the demisee. 
6. Guzman v. M/V Carib, Admiralty No. 39-58, D. Puerto Rico, Oct. 16, 1959. 
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the demise, and that the libel in rem failed in the absence of any personal 
liability. This Note will consider these holdings in light of the development 
and ramifications of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. 
In its origin, the doctrine of unseaworthiness was merely a device 
enabling insurers to avoid indemnifying owners for the loss of ships and 
goods at sea.7 The initial application to seamen occurred in cases of desertion 
of vessels or abandonment of ships' duties by crew members, such derelic-
tions normally being punishable by forfeiture of wages. Upon a showing 
that the vessel was unseaworthy, the seamen were permitted to recover 
wages due.s The next step involved the famous "second proposition" of The 
Osceola,9 an unprecedented dictum that a ship and its owner would incur 
liability to indemnify a seaman for personal injury resulting from the un-
seaworthiness of the ship. The nature of such an indemnity was subse-
quently clarified by Judge Augustus N. Hand in The Scandrett,lO an action 
for personal injury based on unseaworthiness in the absence of negligence.H 
Reviewing the authorities, Judge Hand concluded that the duty to furnish a 
seaworthy ship was absolute.12 This evolution constitutes a remarkable 
example of common law growth and change, if not "a frank excursion into 
7. 1 CAINES, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LAW MERCHANT OF THE UNITED STATES 
308 (1802). 
8. See Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789). 
9. 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The four "propositions," stated in the opinion, supra at 
175, are substantially as follows: (1) that the vessel and its owner are liable for any 
sickness or injury of a seaman to the extent of his maintenance and cure and for 
his wages to the end of the voyage; (2) that the vessel and its owner are liable to 
indemnify a seaman for injuries received as a consequence of the unseaworthiness of 
the ship; (3) that all crew members except the master are fellow servants, and injuries 
sustained through the negligence of a fellow servant are not compensable beyond the 
allowance for maintenance and cure; and (4) that injuries occasioned by accident or 
the negligence of the master or any crew member are not compensable beyond the 
allowance for maintenance and cure. The Osceola case was a negligence action, the 
decision holding that a vessel would not incur liability in rem predicated upon the 
negligence of its master; hence, propositions (1), (3), and (4) were germane to 
the issue at hand. Notwithstanding its questionable origin, however, the "second 
proposition" was destined to take its place among the legal classics. 
10. 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937). 
11. The alleged unseaworthiness was based on a defective ship's doorknob, and 
the jury had found that the defect "was hidden and latent and not discoverable by 
ordinary inspection by competent inspectors." ld. at 710. 
12. In further justification of his decision, Judge Hand noted that shipowners are 
in a position to insure against similar mishaps, thereby treating such liability as a 
business expense. ld. at 711. 
Any lingering doubts regarding the vitality of this proposition were finally dis-
pelled by Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1943), a case involving 
negligently-caused unseaworthiness, wherein the Court voiced approval of The Scandrett: 
The Osceola ... laid down ... the rule of the owner's unqualified obligation 
to furnish seaworthy appliances . . . . It nowhere intimated that the owner 
is relieved from liability for providing an unseaworthy appliance, merely 
because the unseaworthiness was attributable to the negligence of fellow servants 
of the injured seaman rather than to the neg1igence of the owner. Supra at 101. 
(Emphasis added.) 
1962] RECENT CASES 217 
[judicial] legislation."13 However, it is generally conceded that the doctrine 
is warranted by the perilous circumstances and accommodations foisted upon 
a sailor, who has no choice but to stay with his ship, seaworthy or un-
worthy, when underway at sea. 
A definition which might be extracted from the variety of conditions 
which have been held to constitute unseaworthiness is elusive at best, but 
it seems clear that an "appurtenance" of the vessel, rendered defective, is 
requisite. Obviously, injuries caused by defective appliances and equipment 
of the vesseP4 fall within the confines of the doctrine. Likewise, a crew 
member known to have pugnacious proclivitiesI5 may render his ship un-
seaworthy. Equipment brought on board by longshoremenI6 will satisfy the 
test. Furthermore, appliances in themselves entirely fit, if operated in a 
negligent manner, may provide instances (or instants) of "transitory un-
seaworthiness."17 However, equipment or cargo which has not yet become 
"appurtenant," such as a crate being lowered into a ship's hold, has been 
held to be outside the scope of the remedyl8-but the moment the object is 
settled on deck it may satisfy the standard.19 
A line of cases involving ships in "moth-balls," or undergoing major 
structural repairs, establishes that workmen whose job it is to render a ship 
seaworthy can hardly be heard to complain of a defect which contributes to 
the very unseaworthiness they were employed to correct.20 In these cases 
13. Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and The Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 
CORNELL L.Q. 381, 401 (1954). 
14. The H. A. Scandrett, supra note 10 (doorknob); McAllister v. Magnolia Pet-
roleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (wet ladder); Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 
supra note 12 (rope supplied by mate); Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, 364 U.S. 325 
(1960) (wrench). 
15. Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., Inc., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) (assault 
by crew member); The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (C.C. Cal. 1924) (beatings at hands of 
mate). 
16. DeVan v. Pa. R.R. Co., 167 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (cargo hook); 
Considine v. Black Diamond Steamship Corp., 163 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1958) 
(chisel-truck) . 
17. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959) (overloaded 
winch) ; DiSalvo v. 'Cunard Steamship Co., 171 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (poorly 
rigged baggage chute); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) (slime 
on rail). 
18. Carabellese v. Naviera Aznar, S.A., 285 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 
365 U.S. 872 (1961). 
19. Reddick v. McAllister Lighterage Line, Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1958), 
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958). 
20. West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959); Noel v. Isbrandtsen Company, 
287 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 975 (1961); Latus v. United States, 
277 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960). In West v. United 
States, supra at 122, the Court concluded: 
It would be an unfair contradiction to say that the owner held the vessel out 
as seaworthy in [a case involving reactivation of a ship in the "moth-ball fleet"]. 
It would appear that the focus should be upon the status of the ship, the pattern 
of the repairs, and the extensive nature of the work contracted to be done, 
rather than the specific type of work that each of the numerous shore-based 
workmen is doing on shipboard at the moment of injury. 
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the courts have concluded that the status of a deactivated vessel does not 
comport with a warranty of seaworthiness to any person, thereby obviating 
the necessity of determining whether or not the nature of the injured person's 
employment justifies an award based on unseaworthiness. This reasoning is 
strictly limited to ships incapable of going to sea, for in all other instances 
the type of work being performed by the libellant should be controlling-this 
is in consonance with the apparent purpose of the doctrine, that is, the pro-
tection of all those subject to the vicissitudes of the life at sea.21 
It is clear in the Pichirilo case that the equipment in question (boom 
and shackle) was clearly "appurtenant" and that the status of the Carib was 
such that she did warrant her seaworthiness. Furthermore, it has been well 
settled since the case of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki22 that the absolute duty 
to provide and maintain seaworthy appliances is owed to stevedores and 
longshoremen performing loading and unloading operations. Sieracki was 
a stevedore employed by an independent contractor; hence, no actual privity 
or warranty from the shipowner existed. Although the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness had been declared not incompatible with negligence, nevertheless 
it was thought to be essentially non-delictual. This thesis was expounded 
by the respondent in Sieracki,23 and his argument was strengthened by allu-
sion to the accepted term, "warranty of seaworthiness," which seemed to 
imply a contractual duty with an attendant privity requirement. The Court, 
however, had little difficulty disposing of this argument: "It is essentially 
a species of liability without fault . . . neither limited by conceptions of 
negligence nor contractual in character ... a form of absolute duty owing to 
all within the range of its humanitarian policy."24 The Court further in-
dicated that anyone "performing the ship's service with the owner's con-
sent"25 was within this broad range. The case thus marked the incorporation 
of longshoremen "performing the ship's work"26 into the realm of the duty 
owed previously only to seamen. 
The question of in personam liability in the Pichirilo case turns on the 
issue of the demise charter, because of the determination that the ship-
21. It is submitted that in borderline cases, such as ships undergoing "minor 
structural repairs" or shipyard availabilities, any doubts should be resolved in favor of 
"activation," leaving the warranty question to turn on nature of employment. 
22. 328 U.S. 85 (1945). 
23. !d. at 90-93. 
24. [d. at 94, 95. 
25. [d. at 97. 
26. Although Sieracki has been criticized on the grounds that, as an historical 
fact, the unloading of vessels has never been performed by seamen (Tetreault, supra 
note 13, at 413, 414), this academic inconsistency may perhaps be reconciled by view-
ing the loading and unloading processes as sufficiently integral in a ship's cycle of 
operation to be considered "ship's service"-in any event, the proposition of duty owed 
to stevedores by vessel owners is so well established that it will no longer admit 
of argument. 
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owner's duty to maintain his vessel's seaworthiness ceases when he delivers 
the ship to the demisee. This issue involves a balancing of the non-delegable 
character of the duty owed against the demise arrangement whereby the 
respondent owner-demisor relinquishes all control of the vessel to the 
demisee. Militating against the owner's liability in this situation is a 
respected corollary to a demise, that the demisee becomes owner pro hac vice 
(herein ostensibly for the purpose of incurring liability for unseaworthi-
ness) .27 There is no question that the demisee stands in the owner's shoes 
in situations involving collision and negligence.28 Furthermore, several 
decisions have held that the putative "ownership" of the demisee bars an 
action based on unseaworthiness arising after the demise against the actual 
owner,29 the reasoning being substantially as follows: notwithstanding the 
non-delegable aspect of the duty, some privity should exist to justify foisting 
liability upon the owner-why should he incur liability for a condition over 
which he has no control? 
This reasoning was dispositive of the case of Can ella v. Lykes Bros. S. 
S. Co.,so wherein the court denied recovery in personam against the owner, 
indicating however that the controlling factor was that the defect had ob-
tained after the demise. Otherwise (had the defect existed at the time the 
owner turned over the vessel to the demisee) the liability of the owner in 
personam would follow because, at some previous time, he had been in a 
position to correct it. Similar holdings have occurred in Vitozi v. Balboa 
Shipping CO.S1 and Lopez ~I. American-Hawaiian Steamship CO.,S2 both of 
which cases concerned only the question of liability in an action in personam 
against the owner out of controI.S3 The decision in Pichirilo cites these 
27. See Leary v. United States, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 607 (1871); GILMORE AND 
BLACK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 218. 
28. Thorp v. Hammond, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 408 (1870); The Barnstable, 181 
U.S. 464, 468 (1901) (dictum); Santiago v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. N.Y. 
1952) . 
29. Lopez v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 201 F.2d 418 (3d Gr. 1953), 
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 976 (1953); Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d 
Gr. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 859 (1949); Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., 163 F.2d 
286 (1st Gr. 1947). The opinion in the latter case asserted that the demise prevented 
any action based on unseaworthiness against the general owner, irrespective of when 
the defect developed, but in Pichirilo, supra note I, at 813, 814, Judge Aldrich notes: 
Possibly we erred in extending this rule [in the Vitozi case, supra] indis-
criminately to cases where the unseaworthy condition preceded the demise .... 
But we see no reason to reconsider when, as here, the defective condition 
arose only after the owner had parted with all possession. ( 
30. Supra note 29, at 795. 
31. Supra note 29. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Both Vitozi and Lopez were longshoremen employed by demise charterers. 
Both decisions invoked the ownership of the demisee pro hac vice to defeat recovery in 
personam against the general owner for injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of the 
respective vessels. 
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cases with approval, and then concludes that in the absence of any personal 
liability (of the owner-demisor because of lack of control and of the demisee 
because of the workmen's compensation statute), in rem liability would be 
unrealistic because it could only be predicated upon an archaic notion of the 
"personification" of a ship which gives rise to independent liability. In 
this vein, the court stated: 
The concept of a ship as an individual may have an aura of romance 
befitting the lore of the sea, but to regard it as an entity having 
separate responsibilities independent of the primary legal responsi-
bility of some human actor has little rational appeal. This is not 
to say that the "personification" of the vessel is not a convenient 
shorthand method of expressing legal results.34 
But is control, or the ability to correct, the sine qua non of the in personam 
action? Could liability in rem have no other basis than the "personification" 
theory? 
Assuming that liability for unseaworthiness need not be predicated upon 
negligence,35 the conclusion is inescapable that the denial of recovery in 
personam in Pichirilo was based on a presumed transfer, from owner to 
demisee, of the duty to furnish and maintain a seaworthy vessel. Yet this 
proposition may be questioned in the light of principles set forth in the 
Sieracki case36 and the case of Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson.37 
In Sieracki, notwithstanding that the shipowner maintained control of 
the vessel during the loading process and that the injury was caused by ship's 
gear, the Court did not avoid the practical issue of control. Well aware that 
the loading operations were under the exclusive direction of the independent 
stevedoring contractor, the Court noted that the obligation of seaworthiness 
"is peculiarly and exclusively the obligation of the [ship's] owner .... 
It is one he cannot delegate."3s The Court further indicated that in personam 
liability without fault, under these circumstances, was justified by the 
hazardous nature of marine service and the inability of seamen and long-
shoremen to protect themselves against the perils inherent therein, and 
accordingly concluded: 
Those risks are avoidable by the owner to the extent that they may 
result from negligence. And beyond this he is in position, as the 
worker is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping community 
which receives the service and should bear its cost. (Emphasis 
added.) 39 
34. Pichirilo v. Guzman, supra note I, at 814. 
35. Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., supra note 12; Sieracki v. Seas Shipping 
Co., supra note 22. 
36. Supra note 22. 
37. 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). 
38. Supra note 22, at 100. 
39. Id. at 94. 
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The facts of the Petterson40 case more nearly approach Pichirilo in 
that, in the former, the vessel owner had released control to the injured 
stevedore's employer, albeit of only a part of the ship and only for a very 
limited time. However, the injury to Petterson did occur within that limited 
time, on that part of the vessel released, and as a result of defective equip-
ment brought on board by the stevedoring contractor.41 The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit had rejected the argument that the shipowner was 
exempt from liability for unseaworthiness arising after surrender of control 
of the ship to the stevedores, reasoning that that theory could only be based 
on negligence, and that Sieracki unequivocally released the unseaworthiness 
action from its shackles of culpability. The court also indicated that it was 
impelled to its conclusion by "the reference in the Sieracki opinion to the 
'common core of policy which has been controlling' which is found running 
through the decisions permitting longshoremen to recover from ship-
owners .... "42 The court granted recovery in personam against the owner, 
and the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam.43 In so holding, it relied 
solely on Sieracki and Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,44 a similar case where-
in a carpenter, employed by an independent contractor, had been allowed to 
recover against the shipowner in an action based on negligence and unsea-
worthiness, the latter consisting of an uncovered hatch hole through which 
the libellant had accidentally fallen. 
Bearing in mind the fundamental dissimilarity between Petterson and 
Pichirilo (i.e., the existence of a demise charter in the latter), it may be 
questioned whether absolute liability in personam of the shipowner in the 
Petterson case is any less harsh than similar liability would be in Pichirilo, 
and if not, whether the magic appellation "owner pro hac vice" should be 
allowed to dictate such an inconsistency. In the Vitozi, Cannella, and Lopez 
cases,45 Judge Aldrich found good authority for denying recovery in personam 
against the demisor; however, this rule seems to run counter to the "com-
mon core of policy."46 It has been suggested that "the emphasis [in the 
area of unseaworthiness] has shifted from situs to status, from geography to 
policy."47 Viewing the unseaworthiness action in perspective, from The 
40. Supra note 37. 
41. Id. at 479. It was not clear whether the offending equipment, which was a 
block, belonged to the ship or to the stevedoring contractor, but for purposes of the 
appeal, it was assumed to belong to the latter. 
42. Id. at 480. 
43. Supra note 37. 
44. 346 U.S. 406 (1953). Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion, Id. at 419, contains 
an excellent account of the extreme privations encountered by seamen, which are 
responsible for their favored position as "wards of the admiralty." 
45. Supra note 29. 
46. Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson, supra note 37, at 480. 
47. DiSalvo v. Cunard Steamship Co., supra note 17, at 819. 
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Osceola to date, it becomes apparent that a distinct philosophy has steadily 
developed, in consonance perhaps with an increased awareness of the un-
avoidable dangers encountered so frequently by all those performing the 
maritime service, and reflected in the great volume of personal injury litiga-
tion in this area. If the shipping industry is unable to eliminate these hazards, 
perhaps it may be expected to bear the costs of their results. As between 
Guzman and Pichirilo, little question is presented as to the better loss 
distributor. 
Turning to the issue of liability of the Carib in rem, it must be borne 
in mind that Judge Aldrich considered the presence of personal liability a 
condition precedent to recovery in rem, and accordingly found for the 
respondent. In so holding he has leveled a challenge at the very essence of 
the maritime in rem proceeding,48 at least insofar as it has been conceived in 
relation to the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The iconoc1asticism of this 
challenge is enlightened by the dubious support accorded his decision by his 
best authorities. In Burns Bros. v. The Central R.R. of New Jersey,49 a case 
involving collision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a 
finding of liability in rem even though the owner of the offending vessel had 
been personally exculpated in a prior adjudication.50 In Noel v. Isbrandtsen 
Company,51 the libellant's theory in rem was predicated on personal injury 
apart from any warranty of seaworthiness, and was summarily rejected by 
the court. Implicit in the language of the decision, however, is an assumption 
that personal liability would not be a condition of liability in rem in an 
action for unseaworthiness.52 
Why then should liability in personam not constitute a condition pre-
cedent to a successful unseaworthiness action in rem? Why has this proposi-
tion remained unquestioned since its inception, when only a reliance or 
"personification" could sustain it? Is its sustenance still rooted in fiction? 
Or have other considerations dictated its retention? 
It is noteworthy that Judge Learned Hand, in Grillea v. United States,53 
48. See note 4 slIpra. 
49. 202 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1953). 
50. Burns Bros. v. Long Island R. Co., 176 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1949). The barge 
owner, Central R.R. of New Jersey, was exonerated because the collision had been 
chargeable solely to the negligence of the bailee and possessor of the barge, the Long 
Island R. Co., which was adjudged personally liable. The subsequent proceeding in 
rem (SIIpra note 49), however, was necessitated by Burns Bros.' inability to satisfy 
its judgment against the Long Island R. Co., which had gone into reorganization. 
51. Supra note 20. 
52. Commenting on libellant's novel theory of liability in rem, the court noted: 
It is one thing to hold that a conviction or liability in personam is not a condi-
tion precedent to the action in rem; it would be quite another to say that the 
vessel may be held accountable as an entity whell there has bero 110 violatioll of 
the warranty of seaworthilless . .. , (Emphasis added.) 
Noel v. Isbrandtsen Company, supra note 20, at 786. 
53. 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956). The action was brought by a longshoreman for 
1962] RECENT CASES 223 
a case involving a demise charter, was likewise confronted by the thorny 
question of independent liability in rem in an action based on unseaworthi-
ness. Relying on policy considerations, including the vessel owner's ability 
to distribute the loss, as set forth in Sieracki and Petterson, Judge Hand 
imposed liability, likening the in rem recovery to "a kind of 'Workmen's 
Compensation Act' ; though limited by the value of the ship .... "54 Nowhere 
in this opinion is there any mention of the "personification" of the ship. 
Judge Aldrich, in the Pichirilo decision, points out: 
[I]t is true that in Grillea v. United States . .. the court reached the 
opposite result. It did so without discussion, and with only the 
simple statement, "we see no reason why a person's property should 
never be liable unless he or someone else is liable 'in personam' " .... 
With all deference we think so novel a principle needs more support 
than a statement that the court sees no reason against it.55 
But was not Judge Hand merely acknowledging what he considered settled 
law, and suggesting a policy as the real motivation for his rejection of the 
proposed qualification to independent liability in rem? Should liability in 
rem require, or depend upon, personal liability which would itself be in-
dependent of fault? If an unseaworthiness action in personam were to 
necessitate a showing of negligence, then the inconsistency of a naked 
recovery in rem would be patent; since, however, the liability in personam 
is absolute, it would seem unrealistic to encumber the action in rem with 
such a requirement. 56 
In Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser,57 the Supreme Court cited 
Grillea for the proposition that a turnover of control of a ship to a stevedor-
ing company during unloading operations does not include a delegation of 
injuries sustained when he fell through a hatch. The hatch had been rendered unsea-
worthy by the libellant and his companion, who had placed thereon the wrong hatch 
cover. This condition had not existed when the respondent demised the vessel. 
The libel was actually brought in personam against the United States because the 
Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.c. § 741 (1958) denies the right 
to a libel in rem against a vessel owned or chartered by the sovereign. However, the 
Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525, 526 (1920), 46 U.S.c. §§ 742, 743 (1958), 
grants a right in personam against the United States "wherever it shall appear that 
had the vessel or cargo been privately owned and possessed a libel in rem might have 
been maintained"; hence, the adjudication proceeded on principles applicable to a libel 
in rem against a vessel owned by a private person. 
54. [d. at 923. 
55. Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290 F.2d 812, 815 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. granted, - U.S. 
-,82 Sup. Ct. 176 (1961) (No. 358). 
56. Judge Hand observed in Grillea that, "[To say that a person's property should 
never be liable unless he or someone else is liable 'in personam'] would amount to 
saying that there should be no limited liability without fault, although unlimited liability 
without fault is not infrequently imposed." Grillea v. United States, supra note 53, 
at 924. 
57. 358 U.S. 423 (1959). 
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the duty to maintain the vessel's seaworthiness.58 The Crumady case was 
clearly distinguishable, however, from Grillea and Pichirilo, because it did 
not involve a demise charter and the libellant was not an employee of the 
negligent stevedoring contractor, whose liability, therefore, was not limited 
by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.59 
The negligence of the stevedoring contractor in Crumady did permit 
of a third-party action whereby the respondent was allowed indemnity in a 
"recovery over" against the former, not however on a negligence theory 
but rather because of an implied indemnity provision in the contracting 
agreement.60 In cases where such a written agreement between owner and 
independent contractor (who may also be a demisee) does exist, the courts 
have seized upon this contract to allow the vessel owner to recover over in 
a third-party suit based on breach of warranty (express or implied) of 
workmanlike service. This right-over allows ultimate liability to rest on the 
real offender but incidentally frustrates, by a circuity of action, the purpose 
of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.6 ! In 
Grillea an express indemnity provision was alluded to by Judge Hand, but 
apparently not as a basis for his decision. While it might be contended that 
the existence of secondary liability was dispositive of the Grillea case, and 
that therefore Pichirilo (wherein no secondary liability existed, because the 
demise agreement was oral) stands apart even from Grillea, it should be 
noted that the third-party suit is always ancillary to primary liability. Since 
the issue of third-party liability can never arise until primary liability is 
fixed, any reasoning whereby the latter is made to depend upon the former 
seems unduly attenuated. Judge Aldrich noted that, "Grillea has resulted in 
some discussion of the effect of an indemnity clause in the demise .... We 
would agree . . . that the existence of an indemnity clause is beside the 
point:"62 Would not any other conclusion actually be a tacit admission that 
liability for unseaworthiness is not absolute and independent, but merely a 
convenient means of circumventing the limitations of the Longshoremen's 
Act? 
58. !d. at 427. 
59. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950 (1959). This statute, which pro-
vides compensation for injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States, 
allows the stevedore to recover against his employer to the prescribed extent or to 
elect to proceed independently against third persons. 
60. The actual provision of the agreement from which the indemnity was implied 
was "to faithfully furnish such stevedoring services." Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik 
Fisser, supra note 57, at 428. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship 
Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); see generally, White, A New Look at the Shipowl~er's 
Right-Over for Shipboard Injuries, 12 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1960). 
61. Supra note 59. 
62. Pichirilo v. Guzman, supra note 55, at 815. 
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Two recent OpInIOnS, Leotta v. The S.S. Esparta63 and Reed v. The 
Y aka, 64 both virtually indistinguishable from Grillea, have accepted the 
reasoning of the latter. In The Esparta the court recognized that the demisee 
was owner pro hac ~'ice and that the defect had not existed when the ship 
was demised, but concluded that "[ t] he shipowner is always there in the 
background."65 In The Yaka, the court, commenting on the demisee's owner-
ship pro hac vice, noted, "That is a term of art,"66 and pointed out that the 
shipowner "does' retain the right to the return of his ship at some future 
time."67 These cases clearly do not rely on "personification," but rather seem 
to invoke the owner-demisor's reversion in the ship in justification of inde-
pendent absolute liability in rem, which thesis seemingly bespeaks a reliance 
on policy considerations. 
It seems possible, then, that the personification theory, like so many 
other legal fictions, has served as a make-weight, allowing the courts to 
achieve what they considered reasonable results with minimal ripples on 
the judicial calm. As the principle becomes established, the fiction, having 
served its purpose, becomes obscure and is supplanted by the compelling 
considerations which justified its initial utilization. If this be true, then it 
would seem that the identical policy consideration, that is, a solicitude for 
the lot of those performing shipboard work because of the inherently danger-
ous nature of this calling, underlies recoveries in rem and in personam for 
unseaworthiness. Perhaps the unseaworthiness doctrine should therefore 
be considered a primary head of maritime liability, with complementary 
incidents of in rem and in personam recovery, rather than a theory some-
what subservient to these procedural devices. The Supreme Court, in 
Pichirilo, would then be presented only with the question: shall a longshore-
man be precluded from bringing an action based on the unseaworthiness of a 
ship demised to his employer? 
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